Value Driven Threat Modeling
summary
Argues that a lightweight, value-driven threat modeling process lets developers fold security into agile work by adding threat checks to user stories and acceptance criteria rather than doing big up-front models. Uses STRIDE, data‑flow diagrams, attack trees and PASTA as reference tools, a threat library, and the concrete Juice Shop coupon example. Cites 1 security per 100 developers to justify scaling to teams, proposes “definition of done” plus abuser stories and story‑point escalation, and reports iterative usefulness though not high‑assurance for DoD/bank levels.
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chapters (23)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:59Summary
- 2:36About Me
- 6:05Classic Methodologies
- 8:37Attack Trees
- 9:25P.A.S.T.A
- 12:46Documentation?
- 15:41Back to Basics
- 16:42Reframing TM
- 20:30Scope
- 21:21For each feature: Find the value
- 22:45Workflow
- 22:56OWASP Juice Shop
- 24:46Definition of Done
- 25:20Acceptance Criteria
- 25:43Security Unit Tests
- 26:05Abuser Stories
- 26:46Updated User Story Format
- 28:06Threat Pyramid
- 29:35Story Points Relative estimate of effort
- 30:54Communication
- 32:17Benefits over Classic TM
- 33:06Limitations
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