Biometric Unsecurity
summary
Claims that biometrics equal security collapse into specifics: vendor and government systems use face, fingerprint, iris, vein, gait, ECG/EEG and thermal sensors to build centralized databases; UN enrollment already covers 7.2 million refugees and camps hold one million Uyghurs; commercial products include Ring Alexa integrations and a biometric opioid vending machine in Canada; many systems are trivially spoofed or bypassed (photos, propped doors), and the cost to build large models is huge—300000 kg CO2 for one training run.
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chapters (24)
- 0:00Introduction
- 3:04Content Warning
- 3:26What are biometrics
- 8:37Types of biometrics
- 10:27Uniqueness of biometrics
- 17:04Sources of data
- 21:04Psychometrics
- 25:21Compliance
- 28:07Threat modeling
- 31:35Security and Unsecurity
- 32:14Refugees on Security
- 33:47Biometric Unsecurity
- 37:22Education Security
- 40:30Gaze Tracking
- 42:11Biometrics Alter Power
- 43:24Biometrics Unsecurity
- 45:23Penop Iconic Gaze
- 45:58Cultural Genocide
- 47:25Data Sources
- 49:37Interpretation
- 50:16Extraordinary Claims
- 52:01Amazon Ring
- 56:25Transparency
- 58:36Resources
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