Cryptographic Side-Channels on Embedded Devices
summary
Embedded devices leak timings, power and EM so that single power trace reveals whole RSA key when using textbook square‑and‑multiply; adding dummy branches can fail (compiler or fault attacks) and Montgomery ladder is regular but not bulletproof; practical countermeasures are constant‑time arithmetic, randomization (blinding), and d‑order masking forces exponential attacker work at the cost of memory and CPU; post‑quantum schemes (LWE/MLCAM/MLDDSA) enlarge keys and plaintexts and need fresh side‑channel protections; recommended tooling includes ChipWhisperer/Husky for lab evaluation.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Cryptographic side-channels intro
- 1:53Theory versus real-world leakage
- 7:11Embedded devices leak secrets
- 17:31Extracting keys via side-channels
- 23:55AES power traces analysis
- 30:38Breaking RSA with exponent leaks
- 34:31Constant-time exponentiation
- 40:19Standard side-channel defenses
- 45:01Securing public-key crypto
- 48:17Post-quantum threats overview
- 55:26Learning with errors in PQC
- 58:01Key takeaways
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