Identity-based Trust - Till Death Do We Part?
Talkat KubeCon + CloudNativeCon Europe 2025 · on Thursday, 2025-04-03· at 11:00· Level 1 | Hall Entrance S10 | Room C·
summary
Sigstore is used for identity signing but append-only Rekor means illegitimate certificates stay forever; the talk demonstrates an emergency release where a lint rule is removed to bypass CI, witness policy detects the mismatch, and Archivista stores and links all build attestations so policy can reason over them. The mitigation chain uses in-toto attestations plus TUF metadata to revoke and remove compromised images from distribution, so clients refuse the buggy registry blob: Archivista indexes attestations, TUF rejects removed versions.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (12)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:47Traditional signing limits
- 3:31Modern signing with OIDC
- 5:20End-to-end workflow: Fulcio & Rekor
- 6:45Limitations of build provenance
- 8:07Emergency release detection
- 10:14Detecting signing compromise
- 12:20Fixing policy violations
- 13:45Securing artifacts with TUF
- 16:13TUF client trust
- 19:23Why signing alone fails
- 21:13Q&A
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