Attesting Practically: Exploring the Glue Behind Secure Runtime Environments
summary
Demo shows an OCI image getting a signed attestation pushed with cosign keyless signing via OIDC, provenance and a Trivy JSON predicate attached as an in-toto predicates statement, then a Kyverno policy that rejects images missing that attestation or with vulnerabilities above a threshold (example: blocks if score > 8). Workflow uses GitHub Actions to produce SBOM and scan, signs non‑falsifiable attestations with Fulcio/Transparency log, and verification succeeds or fails as expected.
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chapters (16)
- 0:00Start
- 0:51Attestation: the language definition
- 1:23AMAP for software supply chain security
- 2:03Metadata describes artifacts
- 2:58Attestations provide proof about artifacts
- 4:02Policies verify attestations
- 7:10SLSA Levels
- 9:16SLSA definition of attestations
- 11:14SLSA attestation model and terminology - an example
- 11:55SLSA attestation model toolsuite
- 13:09in-toto attestation example
- 17:15Demo flow
- 34:59Vulnerabilities are hard to manage
- 36:26VEX documents
- 37:15VEX + Attestations
- 38:30Takeaways
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