Verified Boot: From ROM to Userspace
summary
Implements full chain measured boot on i.MX6 using HABv4 fuses + signed bootloader (barebox), FIT images, and a 4.0 kernel with IMA/EVM to sign per-file hashes stored as xattr and verified with a per-device HMAC secret decrypted from an encrypted blob. Demo shows tampered /usr/bin/zip fails to execute and system can mark image as compromised. Tools and patches: barebox, FIT, ext4/UBIFS, IMA/EVM, eCryptfs/ecryptfs-like subtree encryption, ~10% boot overhead observed, two-year project, missing mainline directory integrity and UBIFS power-loss robustness. HABv4 fuses, per-device HMAC secret
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Start
- 0:38Why Do We Want To Do a Verified Boot
- 4:14Boot Stages of an Typical Embedded System
- 6:05Bootloader
- 6:21The Bootloader
- 10:07Overview
- 13:47The Extended Verification Module
- 22:32How Do You Secure the Blob
- 45:21Lessons Learned
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