Validating Freedom From Interference in Automotive Linux
summary
Red Hat’s Rivus testbed runs Syzkaller in QEMU entirely inside the QM Podman container (manager and executor in VM‑less mode) while running KSelftests and a light LTP profile on the ASIL‑B side and measuring scheduler latency; fuzzing covers syscalls, sysfs and procfs split into nine groups (about 27 hours across nine groups, ~3 hours per group). Infrastructure uses JumpStarter, TMT and Polarion for automation and traceability. Tests exercise cgroups, device and kernel interfaces, find reproducible failures that are under investigation and produce patches when they are true bugs.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Introduction
- 3:12Mixed-criticality systems
- 8:07Freedom from interference
- 12:20Testing with chaos engineering
- 17:03Syzkaller for QM workloads
- 21:19Test failures and verification
- 24:51Results and limitations
- 26:15Q&A kernel vulnerabilities
- 28:23Q&A graphics and IO scheduling
- 29:28Q&A hardware enablement
- 30:39Q&A cgroup isolation
- 32:56Q&A creating reproducers
- 34:44Q&A safety modes
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