Don't Trust, Verify Panel
summary
Argues that running a full node and verifying blocks matters but verifying software supply chains matters too, proposing reproducible Gideon builds as a better check than lone GPG signatures and recommending signatures from 5–10 independent builders when users can’t build themselves. Calls out failures: Launchpad PPAs rebuilding binaries that don’t match Gideon hashes, short PGP-fingerprint collisions, a privacy wallet that leaked addresses to central servers, and BGP/Stratum attacks — proposes multi-sig code signing and better OS-level verification primitives.
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chapters (20)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:22Dont Trust Verify
- 2:47Verifying Bitcoin Blocks
- 7:43Problems with GPG
- 10:42Problems with Bitcoin Core
- 12:39Fedora
- 14:54Multisig signing
- 17:35Community based defenses
- 19:03Commit access fallacy
- 21:37UASF in Corp
- 23:27UASF in Bitcoin Core
- 25:07Security Service
- 27:20Wallet Security
- 28:11Audience Questions
- 29:50Hash Trees
- 32:23Source Code
- 34:11Verification
- 35:32Software Verification
- 36:54Hardware Verification
- 40:23Alternative implementations
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