Bitcoin Build System Security: Turtles All the Way Down
summary
Reproducible builds (Gitian) stop arbitrary uploads but not poisoned toolchains that implement Ken Thompson style attacks; the claim is that switching to Guix makes the Bitcoin build bootstrapable so toolchains are auditable back to a tiny seed. Working Bitcoin builds exist for all supported Linux architectures; OS X and Windows are in progress. The current bootstrap seed shrinks from 232 MB → 131 MB by removing GCC via the Mess project, with a planned path to hex0 (357 bytes) as the single trusted binary.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Start
- 1:09Download Bitcoin Core
- 2:50Gitian Reproducible Builds
- 4:34Reproducibility is not enough
- 7:21We're Reproducible!
- 7:36We're Reproducibly Malicious
- 9:55Reflections on Rusting Trust
- 10:24Reproducible +
- 13:50Bootstrapping Rust
- 16:13chaincode
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