The Future of Hardware Wallets
summary
Current hardware wallets cannot reliably tell which inputs they control, enabling a CoinJoin attack that signs the same UTXO twice and steals funds; proposed and partially implemented is a proof-of-ownership scheme where each input carries a proof body plus a signature using a fixed identity key (worked on with Trezor) that prevents replay and DoS and is ready for single-key deployment. For Lightning, hardware needs block parsing, a real-time clock and watchtower support; interim mitigation is routing via trusted nodes using a hardware-signed routing token with per-day limits.
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chapters (7)
- 0:00Introduction and context
- 1:08Hardware wallet challenges
- 3:28CoinJoin security vulnerabilities
- 7:17Proposed proof of ownership
- 13:12Lightning Network security
- 18:40Practical implementation path
- 22:14Closing remarks and Q&A
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