Lightning Security Panel
summary
Panelists describe concrete security work: automated fuzz testing against state machines, watchtowers with delegated proofs, and static channel backups for seed recovery. Implementations test cross-compatibility (LND, c-lightning, Eclair) and report a handful of breaches from old backups (about five or six), plus runtime fixes. Experiments include pre-funded/turbo channels, lifting the ~0.16 BTC per-channel practical limit, hardware-wallet designs that run more logic on-device, and ongoing fee and probing mitigations.
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chapters (22)
- 0:00Intro
- 3:07How has Lightning improved
- 4:10Risks of using Lightning
- 10:28LND
- 14:45Endtoend principle
- 16:14Rust vs Go
- 16:50Cross implementations
- 19:30Testing
- 20:58Multiple Implications
- 23:31Lightning Rate
- 24:31Channel Limits
- 26:16Hardware Wallets
- 32:09Dry wallets
- 34:01Channel opening fees
- 35:31Transactions in Lightning
- 36:25Concerns about Lightning
- 37:34Is Lightning more scalable
- 38:27How many breaches have we had
- 39:32What is expected to change in autopilot
- 41:29Should it be impossible to probe
- 43:16Lightning privacy
- 44:31Lightning probing
