Provably Secure Virus Detection: Using the Uncertainty to End Computer Malware
summary
Claim: compile a program by interleaving key shares with its memory and force the machine to reconstruct and erase those shares during a cryptographic challenge-response over the internet, so any injected malware that overwrites consecutive words is detected with high probability. Construction uses additive secret sharing, public‑key encryption, and a small MAC/hardware check to close time‑of‑use attacks; overhead is extra memory and a tiny runtime cost for jumps and decryption, detection happens within minutes in the basic model, and the paper gives formal security proofs though implementations and benchmarks remain future work.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (24)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:21What is Mallory Injection
- 3:30Virus Attack Model
- 4:07Uncertainty Principle
- 4:50General Idea
- 6:19Related Literature
- 7:24Attestation
- 8:18Verification
- 9:43Drawbacks
- 12:49Software
- 13:47Hardware
- 15:48Hardware vs Software
- 16:43Crypto Security
- 19:55Modern Virus Detection
- 22:31The Game
- 23:27The Case
- 24:41Simple Scheme
- 25:41Secret Sharing
- 26:15How to use it
- 28:02Challenge Response
- 29:15Performance
- 30:46Timeofuse attack
- 32:19Two keepers
- 35:36Conclusion
related talks
49mBreaking Hardware-Enforced Security With Hypervisors
45mKeynote: How to Build Hardware Trojans
45m"Advanced Malware Threat: handling obfuscated code using..."
10mState of the Malware
20mEnabling Low-Cost Secure Computing on Untrusted In-Memory Architectures
22mExpert Insights | Keynote
51mFull System Emulation: Achieving Successful Automated Dynamic Analysis of Evasive Malware
52mSecuring The Unseen: Vulnerability Research In Confidential Computing