Short: Unencrypted Flying Objects: Security Lessons from University Small...
summary
Study interviews 8 members across 4 U.S. university clubs and audits 203 repositories and 3 satellite codebases, finding none encrypted communications and vulnerabilities exploitable by ground-based attackers in every project, with only one project implementing command authentication. No club practices systematic threat modeling, and common barriers include prioritizing reliability over security, limited time and expertise, and confusion about amateur radio encryption rules. Concrete examples include a 26-orbit state machine that successfully prevents a flashing payload from blinding ISS crews and concern that a propulsion-enabled CubeSat can become a kinetic threat.
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:53University small satellites
- 2:19Satellite architecture examples
- 3:23Rising risks
- 4:45Research questions
- 5:48Security gaps
- 7:53Barriers to security
- 8:36Adversary threats
- 9:58Call to action
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