Microarchitectural Side-Channel Mitigations for Serverless Applications
summary
Project claims automatic microarchitectural side‑channel mitigation for serverless JavaScript by modifying V8: Scooti modifies V8 to add a CT transformer, CT interpreter and CT compiler that linearize control and data flow and apply ORAM‑style access. Implementation currently covers 60 of 1768 bytecode instructions and manually verifies handlers; microbenchmarks show up to 64% overhead for select/indirect-call patterns. Formal proofs and broader performance/security evaluations are planned.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Microarchitectural side-channel mitigations
- 1:05Shared hardware in serverless
- 2:30Timing and cache side-channel attacks
- 4:16Constant-time execution requirements
- 6:42Limitations of prior solutions
- 8:10Key challenges in Scoy
- 10:20Control and data flow linearization
- 12:10Handling arbitrary data types
- 13:35Performance overhead and optimizations
- 15:06Evaluation with microbenchmarks
- 16:54Future plans and verification
- 17:16Summary of Scoy
- 17:39Q&A
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