Extending or Evolving: Choosing the Path to Quantum Readiness
summary
Panelists state that standards work has produced three final PQC algorithms and one draft, and recommend migration guided by those specs; discovery tools are already shipping that tag found keys and certificates as "quantum vulnerable" or "quantum ready" to prioritize remediation; LMS shows deployment problems for distributed code signing; software PQC implementations suffer practical side‑channel and masking costs that can blow up performance; many data‑center devices have 7–10 year hardware lifecycles, forcing procurement and HSM strategies now.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00Conference overview
- 1:29Quantum readiness positions
- 5:02Business migration priorities
- 8:44Audience questions and risk management insights
- 12:06ML-DSA code signing
- 13:31Post-quantum vs SHA-1
- 15:16Awareness to action
- 18:49Certificate validation
- 20:59Hybrid crypto feasibility
- 22:05Migration timelines
- 24:32PQC side-channel risks
- 26:41Government procurement
- 28:38Next crypto challenges
- 30:07Mosca’s theorem risks
- 31:32Vendor collaboration
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