Privacy Design Flaws
summary
Examines concrete architecture mistakes: a contact‑tracing app that continuously sends location+Bluetooth to a government cloud, Netflix’s 500,000 ratings deanonymized by correlating IMDb, Facebook Graph API scope abuse that enabled Cambridge Analytica profiling, and Android logs leaking contact‑tracing data to privileged apps. Explains why encryption or trusted hosts don’t fix design flaws, shows threat‑modeling, logging‑policy and data‑minimization fixes actually used, and argues for enforceable API scopes, data classification, and shared privacy design patterns.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Start
- 1:58Motivation
- 3:39Two types of risks
- 6:06Mistaking data protection for privacy
- 9:20False anonymity
- 12:23Data leakage
- 14:41The problem, summarized
- 16:06Solutions - Principles to abide by
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