Elections: Trust and Critical Infrastructure
summary
Norway now requires a manual preliminary count of paper ballots and treats voting systems as national security under the new law, yet no national process exists for when manual and machine counts diverge. Computers in Norway produce bugs on Election Day and 203 licensed vendors include non‑Norwegian suppliers with remote support access. Election security centers on software independence and simple, observable checks: randomized risk‑limiting audits of paper ballots, segmentation, visible diagnostics, and tested manual operations because internet voting remains the easiest covert attack.
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Election security concerns
- 2:55Fear in security responses
- 5:51Hardest security problem
- 9:50Manipulated election results
- 12:39Government as biggest threat
- 15:59Anonymity and coercion in voting
- 21:20Manual vs machine elections
- 23:55Ballot counting error risks
- 37:58Software independence in voting
- 42:56Auditable elections with verification
- 47:15Risk limiting audits
- 51:13Attacks on critical infrastructure
- 56:18Securing legacy systems
- 57:34Q&A
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