Introduction to Election Security
summary
Norway moves from un-audited machine-only counting to a manual preliminary count (used in two national elections) and a legal reframing of elections as national security, arguing for software independence. Examples: recurring ballot-counting bugs (name-parsing and font/column errors), operators re-running scanners until two machine runs match, and practical manual audits that expose bugs. Threat model treats the sitting government as highest risk; mitigation aims at human-auditable returns and statistical risk-limiting audit sampling.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00Start
- 11:13does not take into consideration security and anonymity concerns, it is a full implementation of the Electoral System.
- 13:13It's complicated.
- 16:55Preventing a coup
- 20:47The same government running the election
- 21:291. A correct election
- 24:50Prevent vote selling
- 28:41You don't want to connect a vote to a person
- 31:23Isn't manual counting slow?
- 46:40Manual elections?
- 46:56Software independence
- 47:27cannot cause an undetectable change or error in
- 48:56Verify the election results
- 54:57What's a Risk Limiting Audit? A statistical model for manual ballot sampling
- 56:45What was is the problem in Norway?
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