Winkle: Foiling Long Range Attacks in Proof-of-Stake Blockchains
summary
Winkle requires ordinary wallets to embed users sign transaction-originated votes so chains carry attestations from historically online accounts; combined with key-rotation ties votes to history and a bound on adversary stake plus limited coin movement (an FY + X inequality) the protocol prevents adversaries who buy past validator keys from forging checkpoints. Minting is delayed until checkpointed, and simulations on Bitcoin/Ethereum show realistic user activity means naive signing is rare (50 days to years inactive) so optional delegation to active wallets improves practicality.
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chapters (16)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:31Proof of Work
- 0:50Problems with Proof of Work
- 2:05Proof of State
- 2:19Proof of Stake
- 5:02Longrange Attacks
- 7:55Sign to blows
- 9:12Longrange attack
- 12:07Summary
- 17:33What could go wrong
- 19:08Security
- 20:30Chi Rotation
- 26:49Minting Block Rewards
- 27:56Efficiency
- 28:40Delegation
- 29:38Checkpointing
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