AtomicDisk: A Secure Virtual Disk for TEEs against Eviction Attacks
summary
SGX‑PFS uses Merkle hash trees, an in‑enclave cache and a recovery journal but allows privileged hosts to capture transient snapshots during cache eviction. AtomicDisk adds an internal commit operation and a per‑image committed flag plus journal replay to enforce sync atomicity, guaranteeing all writes before fsync commit atomically. Trace-driven tests show SGX‑PFS produces hundreds of thousands of vulnerable snapshots per trace while AtomicDisk produces exactly one valid state per sync and matches or outperforms SGX‑PFS on common workloads.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00AtomicDisk and TEEs intro
- 0:37Threat model for secure disks
- 2:03Security attributes needed
- 3:33Intel SGX PFS security
- 5:25Anticipated snapshots in TEEs
- 6:49Why anticipated snapshots are vulnerable in TEEs
- 7:57Eviction attack on Redis
- 9:20Syn-atomicity defense
- 10:46AtomicDisk design
- 12:54AtomicDisk recovery
- 13:16Evaluation setup and results
- 14:22Performance vs baselines
- 15:50Summary and open-source
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