COVID-19 Apps: Public Health or Hype?
summary
Worked examples: audits and crypto testing on national apps including the Dutch CoronaMelder, analysis of GAEN (Google Apple Exposure Notifications) and server back ends, and an EU Review Facility running public audits. Key findings: GAEN is required for iPhone so most national apps use a decentralized model, uptake matters — 38% uptake → 14.44% of contacts detected, 12% → 1.44% cases, Bluetooth gives many false positives, known CVEs and easy spoofing via simple hardware emulators.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (20)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:30What is contact tracing
- 3:05Why digital contact tracing
- 5:10Decentralized protocols
- 6:55Centralized protocols
- 8:05Google Apple API
- 9:58The problem
- 10:14False negatives
- 11:23False positives
- 12:23Security
- 13:42Permissions
- 14:26Abuse
- 16:17Side channel attack
- 17:18Privacy
- 18:59Data Retention
- 22:45Source Code
- 24:14Anticompetition
- 24:35Political questions
- 25:15Tech questions
- 25:39Review Facility
related talks
40mCOVID Contact Tracing Apps: Balancing Privacy, Security, and Health
42mContact Tracing : Exposure Notification API & StopCovid
01h 15mEXPOSURE NOTIFICATION DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RECONCILING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC...
13mIs it Worth Giving Up Privacy for Public Health Benefits?
24mCracking open the COVIDSafe
31mPanel on Privacy
19mKeynote: Breaking Transmission Chains with JavaScript
01h 14mMobile Health