Non-malleable Codes Against Constant Split-state Tampering
summary
Constructs the first explicit constant-rate for c=10 non-malleable code in the c split-state model, with exponentially small error and an efficient encoder that samples a uniform element from the extractor inverse image while the decoder is the seeded non-malleable extractor. The proof builds an extractor via additive combinatorics: polynomial encodings, coordinate-wise multiplication, and product estimates guarantee leftover entropy; composing with known reductions yields codes down to c=2 and improves prior n^{1/7} error to exponential.
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chapters (23)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:27Circumventing Classical Bounds Can we circumvent classical tradeoffs on rate vs. error tolerance? -Relax requirements.
- 1:07New view of corrupting codewords
- 1:42Additive tampering functions
- 2:30Algebraic Manipulation Detection Codes [Cramer, Dodis, Fehr, Padro, Wichs] With focus on error detection, no restriction on wt(e). Randomized encoder: Enc Deterministic decoder: Dec, can also output 'error
- 3:36Handle More Tampering Functions?
- 8:17An easy F
- 8:45General setting
- 8:59Tampering functions in the C-split-state model
- 10:18Non-malleable codes in the C-split-state model
- 12:07Outline
- 12:36Codes from extractors
- 12:51Randomness Extractors [Nisan-Z]
- 14:49Aside: Extractors & List Decoding
- 21:19Seedless Normalleable Multi-source Extractors
- 22:10NM Codes from NM Extractors
- 23:13Encoding Efficiently
- 24:18Additive Combinatorics A=set of integers, A+A=set of pairwise sums.
- 26:20Achieving Intermediate Goal
- 26:59Actual Seedless NM Extractor
- 27:16A sum-product estimate over Fp4
- 27:53Conclusions • First constant-rate non-malleable code in C-split- state model for any Cro(n).
- 28:29Open Questions
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