Piloting Edge Copilot
summary
Edge’s WebUI enforces strong CSP and TrustedTypes and is served from the browser binary, but Bing endpoints expose ~10 distinct XSS vectors and privileged APIs. Built PoCs chain an XSS + split-tab/openener bypass + permission-delegation iframe (allow= camera,microphone) to trigger camera access, and another uses DiscDiscover.Chat.user.say / searchMemory prompt injection with Markdown links to exfiltrate chat history. Multiple attacks reliably work; Edge design helps, Bing integration breaks it.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (5)
- 0:00Edge Copilot piloting
- 9:59Bing vulnerabilities for Edge Copilot
- 17:00HTML injection in page titles
- 23:13Camera access exploit
- 29:18AI integration security risks
related talks
44mCutting Edge: Microsoft Browser Security — From People Who Owned It
31m1; mode=attack XSS Attacks By Abusing the XSS Filter
43mThe AI Assistant’s Betrayal: One-Click for AI to Turn into the Perfect Insider
34m"The magic of XSS - not only in web applications"
34mBingBang: Hacking Bing.com (and much more) with Azure Active Directory
31m360° View of XSS
34mBreaching the Perimeter via Cloud Synchronized Browser Settings
55mCall To Arms: A Tale of the Weaknesses of Current Client-Side XSS Filtering