Dynamic Process Isolation
summary
Cloudflare Workers use in-process isolation for speed but allow Spectre-style transient attacks from JavaScript: a V8-based type‑confusion primitive reads 64‑bit addresses and achieves ~120 bits/hour leakage in a 30s worker. Defense samples hardware events via performance monitoring counters (rdpmc), normalizes by executed code, and uses a ~40K threshold to trigger dynamic process isolation (2% perf hit, ~1% false positives). Defense is implemented and deployed in production at Cloudflare and greatly reduces practical leakage.
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chapters (5)
- 0:00Start
- 13:27Pointer Compression
- 14:16How Javascript's Internal Implementation Works
- 18:15Performance Monitoring Counters
- 24:14Conclusion
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