Extension Breakdown...
summary
Two new attacks bypass browser extension resource controls: a timing side‑channel against Chromium/Firefox access checks that a JavaScript PoC uses to enumerate installed extensions (authors claim 100% detection versus 10% for previous heuristics, tested on ~10,620 extensions), and a Safari leak where injected frames expose randomized URIs — static analysis of 721 Safari extensions flags 40.5% of Safari extensions as probably leaking identifiers. A 200‑person PoC shows this boosts fingerprinting entropy; vendors receive disclosures and proposed mitigations.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:19Extensions
- 1:23Resources Control Policies
- 2:50Access Control Settings
- 6:52URI Randomization
- 11:09Impact
- 15:10Vulnerability Disclosure
- 18:13Security Proposal
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