Mario Heiderich
where else to find them
no profile links on file
what they talk about
all 5 in the filters
where they keep going back
no series more than once — all 8 in the filters
on a stage with
- David Mathyonce
- David Molnaronce
- David Rookonce
all 20 in the filters
who talks about the same things
- Erlend Oftedal12 talks
- Alex Sexton12 talks
- Alex Mackey7 talks
- Benedek Gagyi8 talks
- Philippe De Ryck39 talks
- Gareth Heyes5 talks
| title | conference | date |
|---|---|---|
| Closing Remarks | OWASP Global AppSec Amsterdam 2019 | 2019-09-23 |
Thanks and reminders focus on logistics and community: long gratitude for volunteers and sponsors, mention of a return to Dublin next year and San Francisco in… | ||
| An Infosec Timeline: Noteworthy Events From 1970 To 2050 | OWASP Global AppSec Amsterdam 2019 | 2019-09-23 |
Chronological catalogue claims the first worm Creeper and counter‑worm Reaper, the NSA’s early IDS and Clifford Stoll’s honeypot that catches Markus Hess, the… | ||
| How to build your own Infosec Company | nullcon Goa 2019 | 2019-03-01 |
Builds a boutique pen‑test firm (kept at ~20 people) that wins a large US browser vendor as first client, uses Google Drive and Slack for collaboration, keeps… | ||
| Keynote - How To Build Your Own Infosec Company | BSides Lisbon 2018 | 2018-11-29 |
Builds a small boutique infosec firm (5–20 people), gets the first client via Twitter, uses Google Docs and Slack, git, off‑site backups and a strict calendar… | ||
| XSS is dead. We just don't get it. | OWASP AppSec Europe 2018 | 2018-07-02 |
Claim: XSS is technically solvable — specific defenses exist and catch most cases — yet it persists because of implementation gaps and incentives. Concrete… | ||
| An Abusive Relationship with AngularJS | beyond tellerrand // DÜSSELDORF 2016 | 2016-05-09 |
Shows concrete failings: repeated sandbox bypasses in AngularJS 1.x (constructor/.__proto__/toString tricks, later charAt override) that regain DOM access… | ||
| An Abusive Relationship with AngularJS v2 | RuhrSec 2016 | 2016-04-28 |
Deep dive into AngularJS 1.x vulnerabilities with concrete exploits and timelines: sandbox bypass via Function constructor and prototype/toString tricks… | ||
| An Abusive Relationship with AngularJS | CODE BLUE 2015 | 2015-10-28 |
Detailed catalog of real exploits against AngularJS 1.x: multiple sandbox bypasses across AngularJS 1.x (constructor/proto/getPrototype tricks, array sort and… | ||
| Copy Pest - A Case Study On The ClipBoard, Blind Trust And Invis... | OWASP AppSec Research (AppSecEU) 2015 | 2015-05-19 |
Demonstrates concrete clipboard XSS: document apps create multiple clipboard “buckets” (HTML/RTF/text), attackers modify styles.xml or document.xml (rename… | ||
| nothing matches | ||