Luke Valenta
where else to find them
bluesky:lukevalenta.bsky.social
what they talk about
where they keep going back
no series more than once — all 4 in the filters
on a stage with
- Christof Paaronce
- David Adrianonce
- Emilia Käsperonce
all 16 in the filters
who talks about the same things
- Tomas Gustavsson9 talks
- Bas Westerbaan2 talks
- Nick Sullivan11 talks
- Mike Ounsworth5 talks
- Bill Newhouse6 talks
- Michael Maximilien19 talks
| title | conference | date |
|---|---|---|
| Making PQ Signatures work in the WebPKI | Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference Austin 2025 | 2025-01-15 |
Post‑quantum drop‑in signatures blow up TLS handshakes (hash‑based up to ~50 KB, ML‑DSA ~14–20 KB), so the proposal evaluates practical mitigations: Merkle… | ||
| Why the Internet isn’t ready for Post-Quantum Certificates | Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference Austin 2025 | 2025-01-15 |
NIST standards are final and browsers ship post‑quantum key agreement, and Cloudflare reports over 30% of human connections using PQ key agreement, but… | ||
| Monsters in the Middleboxes: Building Tools for Detecting HTTPS Interception | Black Hat USA 2019 | 2019-08-03 |
An open-source Go library called Monster-in-the-Middle Engine fingerprints TLS client hellos and compares them to HTTP User-Agent strings to flag mismatches… | ||
| In Search of CurveSwap: Measuring Elliptic Curve Implementations in the Wild | Black Hat Europe 2018 | 2018-12-03 |
Internet-wide ZMap scans contact 41 million IPv4 hosts and find 28.8 million supporting ECDH, with 22% of TLS servers reusing ephemeral keys and 8,000+ servers… | ||
| DROWN: Breaking TLS Using SSLv2 | USENIX Security '16 | 2016-08-10 |
Demonstrates DROWN, a cross‑protocol exploit that uses an SSLv2 server sharing an RSA key as an oracle to decrypt modern TLS sessions. Two variants: the… | ||
| nothing matches | ||