Zero trust CI/CD pipeline
summary
A team replaces long‑lived service keys with short‑lived tokens using GitHub→GCP OIDC federation and workload identity federation, wires that up with a public Terraform module from registry, and enforces service‑account impersonation for least privilege. Over twelve weeks they run threat modeling, remove insecure logging of PII, enable 2FA, and segment environments so dev pipelines cannot touch prod. The pipeline is live and functioning and the process becomes part of every sprint as an ongoing risk‑management practice.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (20)
- 0:00Start
- 4:54Week 283
- 5:33Week 3
- 8:06Findings & Recommendations
- 9:45Week 5
- 10:35Week 6
- 13:22What is an asset?
- 13:55Security Goals
- 15:15Prioritize and fix
- 19:04Definition - Zero Trust CI/CD
- 19:58Never Trust Always Verify
- 21:27Least Privilege Implementation
- 22:11Environment Segmentation
- 22:22Two Factor Authentication
- 22:40Do Not Log PII & sensitive data
- 25:33GitHub ID Token format
- 27:57Generating Federated Token - GitHub action Code
- 29:26Technical Implementation flow - Recap
- 30:072 factor authentication
- 33:32The Team
related talks
17mOIDC and CICD: Why Your CI Pipeline Is Your Greatest Security Threat
43mThe art of secure software: Zero-trust delivery pipelines
35mBeyond build/test/deploy
50mDestroying Long-Lived Cloud Credentials with Workload Identity Federation
37mIs Your Approach to Pipeline Security Flawed? Rethinking CI/CD Security
33mSecuring Your Infrastructure as Code Pipeline
18mLet Devs Be Devs Without Sacrificing Security
21mImplementing Zero Trust Security in Jenkins Pipelines With Open Source Tools