Fixing authentication and authorization
summary
API-backed apps fail mostly at authorization: broken object-level authorization, mass assignment and fragile layered logic lead to IDORs that let attackers iterate invoice IDs or flip admin=true in JSON. Attackers leverage leaked credentials — roughly 2.5 billion leaked credentials — and k-anonymity checks from haveibeenpwned wordlists for password spraying. SMS 2FA breaks via SS7 access for €500 and SIM swap; phishing proxies like evil-nginx phishing proxy capture passwords and TOTP. Fixes: use U2F/FIDO2, validate auth in each service, avoid localStorage for JWTs, consider Apache Shiro or Open Policy Agent for centralized policies.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (33)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:12Why this should be interesting
- 2:18Googles vulnerabilities program
- 3:13Common misconceptions
- 4:33Password dumps
- 5:11Unique identities
- 5:29Password spraying
- 7:20Have I Been Poned
- 8:31Attack Surface
- 9:52Enumeration
- 11:33Authentication and authorization
- 12:01SMS interception
- 15:32How it works
- 16:33Phishing
- 17:10Security keys
- 18:16ToF
- 19:20Authorization
- 21:51Business logic
- 23:19API endpoint
- 24:22Open Policy Agent
- 25:52Shiro
- 26:44Instancelevel permission checks
- 27:46OpenPolls Agent
- 28:57OPA
- 29:45JWTs
- 30:29Common failures
- 32:05Out of order requests
- 33:08Microservices
- 33:35Common Scenario
- 34:13Common Mistake
- 35:49Tokens
- 37:22SPS
- 38:09Questions
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