Let's talk about routing security
summary
Global routing shows about 7.5 lakh prefixes in tables with roughly 79.5% valid IRR objects, ~7.7% missing and ~12.7% mismatched, so 20% of the routing table would be blackholed by strict IRR filtering. Hurricane Electric deploys large‑scale IRR filtering (strict for networks announcing <5000 prefixes) and finds tooling and operational automation lacking. Practical tools include BGPQ3 and IRR D and visibility services like bgp.he.net; RPKI adoption (AT&T rejecting invalids) and Google’s planned filtering change are shifting incentives.
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chapters (20)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:00Outline
- 1:21Fundamentals
- 4:13BGP
- 5:05DNS
- 6:15Trust in BGP
- 7:18Example
- 8:59Internet routing registries
- 9:23Introduction to IRR
- 10:33IRR Example
- 14:19BGP Q3
- 15:46Fundamentals of BGP routing
- 19:07Statistics for India
- 20:11Does it really matter
- 21:53Routing cases
- 25:48Why this is happening
- 27:46Whats the future
- 27:58Recent developments
- 30:12RPK
- 31:57Summary
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