Recent TPM Security Enhancements to the Linux Kernel
summary
Recent Linux kernel patches (merged in 6.10) make every TPM transaction use sessions salted to a kernel-derived null primary so a changed null seed after a TPM reset breaks session setup and is detected within ~30–60 seconds, causing the kernel to disable the TPM. Userland tools export and later verify the null primary name (via sysfs/CFS) using the OpenSSL tpm2 engine toolchain and a makecredential/activatecredential flow; the demo shows an interposer stealing a disk unlock secret when userland toolkits fail to verify the TPM key.
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Recent TPM security enhancements
- 1:03TPM hardware and interposer attacks
- 3:28TPM sessions and limitations
- 5:34Session key establishment weaknesses
- 8:23TPM reset attacks and PCR issues
- 11:10Endorsement Key certificates and privacy
- 14:22Reasons for EK certificate restrictions
- 16:50Privacy CA challenges
- 18:56Early boot TPM validation
- 20:20Kernel null primary hierarchy
- 23:52User space TPM verification tools
- 26:35Live TPM interposer attack demo
- 37:31Conclusions and future directions
- 39:16Q&A
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