Making remote attestation meaningful for external reviews
summary
Project Oak demonstrates a concrete pipeline so end users can verify exactly which code runs in a TEE: it uses AMD SEV‑SNP measurements taken before boot, a minimal Oak Restricted Kernel plus stage zero that marks executable pages read‑only, and delivers a single attestation report bound to a kernel key plus up to 64 bytes of client data. Releases publish provenance, transparency log inclusion proofs and reproducible builds so external reviewers can map the measurement hash back to specific source commits.
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chapters (6)
- 0:00Introduction to Project Oak
- 2:13Trusted execution environment
- 8:21Measuring workloads with SEV-SNP
- 13:19Enabling external reviews
- 17:39Ensuring code integrity over time
- 20:50Summary and future work
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