The Boeing 737 MAX: When Humans and Technology Don't Mix
summary
Boeing fits larger engines onto an old 737 airframe, creates MCAS software to counteract a nose-up pitch, then hides it to avoid additional pilot training; a failed angle‑of‑attack sensor feeds false data into a single active AoA sensor path so MCAS repeatedly trims the stabilizer, pilots follow the checklist but the manual trim wheel becomes impossible to crank at high speed, 346 people die, and Boeing faces roughly $20 billion in losses and global groundings.
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Welcome to Boeing 737 MAX crisis
- 7:46What happened in the 737 MAX crashes
- 15:33MCAS flawed solution to hardware
- 23:05Pilot controls and manual override limits
- 30:54Training lessons for life-critical systems
- 41:03Mode confusion and failed alerts
- 45:37Redundancy failures in 737 MAX
- 51:36Engineers' role in unsafe design
- 53:21Q&A on systems and accountability
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