Fantastic Extractable Value and Where to Not Find It
summary
Argues that MEV already creates millions of dollars a day and surveys concrete countermeasures: sending transactions direct-to-miner (Flashbots, TaiChi) eliminates public mempool front‑running but requires trust; commit‑reveal / submarine sends hide payloads at UX cost; RFQ models and CowSwap remove arbitrary takers so RFQ models effectively eliminate many MEV vectors; keeperDAO, bProtocol and BlocksRoute show unionized capture of fees that returns value to users rather than bots.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:19WTF Is Miner Extractable Value (MEV)? abbreviated
- 1:55Liquidations
- 2:59DEX Frontrunning, Backrunning, and Sandwiching
- 4:42MEV Doesn't Exist in a Vacuum
- 7:29Roll over and die
- 8:07Embrace It And Take It For Yourself
- 8:59Prevent It By Adapting
- 10:18Hide The MEV
- 13:20Unionize
- 16:17Evolve
- 20:33More DAO-ification
- 22:10A More Level Playing Field
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