A2MM: Mitigating Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering and Consensus Instability
summary
Proposes A2MM as an application-layer fix that forces traders to atomically capture arbitrage inside one transaction, reducing extractable MEV; models miner choice with a Markov decision process and finds a miner with 10% hashpower will fork when MEV ≥ 4× block reward, noting real-world spikes up to 874× (bZx). Works without protocol changes and lowers sandwich risk via a minimum-profitable-victim-input rule, but is limited by block gas limits, complex on‑chain optimality and MEV that must occur in future blocks.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (8)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:15Why maximizing MV might be problematic
- 2:18Modelling the problem
- 4:01How to mitigate
- 4:23arbitrage example
- 5:36pros and cons
- 7:00example
- 7:40Application layer solution
related talks
31mMEV is Fundamental to Permissionless Systems
27mSmart Transactions
23mWhy You Should Be Optimistic About MEV
34mMEV Panel
18mMEV Minimization on L2: Solution Space and Design Constraints
29mMonoxide: Scale out Blockchains with Asynchronous Consensus Zones
51mEconomic Security of Distributed Systems
23mScaling Wars: The Race to Speed Up On-Chain Infrastructure