Qubes OS
summary
Qubes OS claims practical desktop security by isolating tasks into separate VMs rather than fixing every bug, using Xen hypervisor and IOMMU (VT-d) to put networking and USB stacks into netVM/usbVMs, shipping with Fedora 20 templates and optional Windows 7 VMs. Release 2 already implements compartmentalized net/USB/GUI domains, disposable VMs for opening attachments, and split-GPG support; release 3 adds a hypervisor abstraction layer to switch to KVM or other backends. The build runs and demos key features like isolated networking and disposable-attachment VMs.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (12)
- 0:00Intro
- 1:14We really need secure CLIENT systems
- 2:09Problems with current (desktop) systems
- 5:39Monolithic kernel is bad for security
- 6:29Monolithism beyond kernel
- 9:53What so special about Virtualization?
- 13:08Lesson
- 15:11TOMMU (AKA Intel VT-d)
- 17:57Qubes OS Releases
- 18:25Use of Linux (and other OSes)
- 18:59Qubes as a platform for secure privacy-oriented Apps
- 20:11Qubes OS R3 ("Odyssey")
related talks
32mQubes OS: Security Through Isolation
24mThe future of the desktop is on hypervisor powered containers
21mUsing a cloud to manage a cloud
45mLife Behind the Tinfoil: A Look at Qubes and Copperhead
41mSecuring Your Xen-Based Cloud
57mDay 2 Keynote: Security Through Distrusting
34mIn-Guest Mechanism to Strengthen Guest Separation
35mExtending Quality Management with Audio, Video, and KVM using Podman Quadlets