Securing Your Xen-Based Cloud
summary
Xen uses split drivers, PV versus HVM modes, and optional isolation features to reduce exploitable surface: enable driver domains to move NIC/PCI drivers out of Dom0, use PV-grub (Fedora ships pvgrub image; Debian users must build) to avoid Dom0 pygrub parsing, and run qemu device emulation in per-VM stub domains so an exploit needs two bugs instead of one (three qemu exploits were published in two years). Compile and apply the flask example policy (4.3 run in warning mode first). IOMMU/IRQ remapping is required; disaggregation often improves scalability.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:03Agenda
- 9:07Network Path
- 15:52PVGRUB
- 19:49attack surface
- 25:00flask
- 26:04Summary
- 26:31Questions
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