Poison Control: Unifying Software and Content...
summary
Demonstrates a concrete Dual-Provenance Pattern that ties cosign-verified OCI image signatures to content checks: Kyverno cluster policies inject an initContainer (or WASM injector) that runs a C2PA verifier to fetch ONNX model + .c2pa sidecar from GCS, validate signatures and the manifest assertions, then allow the main container to start or block the pod. Live demo shows signed model pods reach Running while unsigned ones fail admission; repo and playbooks are public.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Software and content provenance
- 2:11Software versus content security
- 6:07C2PA framework for provenance
- 17:11Repository setup overview
- 20:05Software provenance with Kyverno
- 25:24Content provenance with C2PA tools
- 29:43Content provenance with WASM
- 32:11Live demo results
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