Securing the Hypervisor with Control-Flow Integrity
summary
Adds clang's CFI and SafeStack to QEMU, with upstream patches that work but require clang and LTO for whole-binary jump tables. Implements SafeStack per coroutine (manual allocation and pointer updates) and iCFI via ordered jump tables to block ROP and indirect-call hijacks. Results show about mitigates ~33% of vulnerabilities (35% are overflows) and blocks many zero-day integrity chains, but modules and shared libraries are unsupported and requires clang + LTO (heavy CI/build cost); cross-DSO CFI is future work.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:29Outline
- 0:49Why Control-Flow Integrity
- 6:02Implementing Control-Flow Integrity
- 6:42Protecting the Stack - Shadow Stack The standard protection against Stack Smashing
- 7:45Protecting the Stack - Safe Stack
- 8:25Shadow Stack vs Safe Stack
- 9:37Implementing Safe Stack in QEMU
- 10:38Protecting Function Pointers
- 13:20Implementing icall CFI in QEMU
- 15:44Status of patches
- 16:59Did we accomplish something?
- 17:27What's next?
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