Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
summary
A revelation‑principle analogue shows up for short‑term commitment settings: mechanisms can be written as direct Blackwell mechanisms that map types to posterior beliefs and then to allocations, with allocations conditionally independent of type given the belief. The paper uses Blackwell‑experiment/Bayesian‑persuasion tools and perfect Bayesian equilibrium to reduce the designer’s search to a constrained optimization over participation, truthtelling, and Bayes’ plausibility constraints. The result restores a tractable design language for single‑agent dynamic pricing, infinite‑horizon bargaining and product personalization under future price discrimination.
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Start
- 3:30What Is the Revelation Principle
- 5:06Function Composition
- 15:40Determinants of Price Discrimination
- 21:47Short-Term Mechanisms
- 31:28Revelation Principle
- 33:31Complexity of Dynamic Mechanism Design
- 38:25Belief Approach
- 50:03How To Represent Mechanism Design
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