Keynote: How much security is too much?
summary
Argues that excessive security slows real-world innovation and gives concrete counterexamples and metrics: a mobile rollout for geo (300M users) forces choosing between delayed higher security or letting users adopt worse alternatives; high-profile iPhone exploits yield iPhone infections 0 in community scans while Android problems affect <2% of devices and Windows infections remain far higher; experimental BadUSB spurs lots of defensive email despite no field cases; advocates incremental monitoring and measures mean time to breach <1 week via red teams.
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chapters (29)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:05Geo
- 2:35Security professionals
- 3:18Product vs InfoSec
- 5:35iPhone
- 7:51Android
- 8:25Android infections
- 9:57Windows infections
- 11:12Android vs Windows
- 11:47Risk vs Vulnerability
- 12:10Bad USB
- 13:30Car security
- 14:04Safety
- 16:00Innovation
- 16:43How companies approach security
- 18:19Target case
- 19:33People do circumvent
- 19:45Security controls are unreasonable
- 20:03Service oriented architecture
- 21:36Preventing damage
- 23:39Why does security exist
- 25:34Security vs innovation
- 26:48Monitoring
- 28:08Threat Intelligence
- 29:56Conclusion
- 31:10Question
- 33:06Formula
- 34:46Innovation Friendly Security
- 35:42Transition Path
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