Dirty Bin Cache: A New Code Injection Poisoning Binary Translation Cache
summary
Claims a new code‑injection method called AOT poisoning that corrupts Rosetta 2 AOT files by modifying an x86_64 binary via mmap without calling msync so the AOT lookup hash (based on timestamps and headers) stays the same; uses the translate/transit tool to produce poisoned .aot files, ad‑hoc signing to keep Mach-O headers identical, and hdiutil-mounted non‑APFS volumes to bypass Apple’s APFS fix. Demo shows TCC screen‑capture bypass and hidden payloads in SIP‑protected locations. Also presents XC cache poisoning on Arm Windows using an XDA/XT translator tool; both PoCs work until platform‑specific mitigations.
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chapters (17)
- 0:00Introduction to research
- 1:09Arm-based OS technologies
- 2:38Previous research recap
- 3:40MacOS security model
- 6:03Rosetta 2 internals
- 10:21AOT cache mechanism
- 12:24AOT poisoning technique
- 16:44MacOS demo and limitations
- 18:25Signed executable bypass
- 20:36Bypassing Apple's fix
- 23:15AOT poisoning plus demo
- 24:27TCC bypass and exploits
- 28:22MacOS patch analysis
- 29:33Windows internals analysis
- 32:05Windows cache poisoning
- 34:35Windows demo and mitigation
- 37:48Conclusion and Q&A
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