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sandboxes: no thy limit

Talkat AppSec California 2014 · on Monday, 2014-01-27· [security]
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Windows application sandboxes (examining Sandboxie, Adobe ReaderX and Chrome) have architectural limits: kernel bugs let sandboxed renderers escalate to SYSTEM via font parsing exploits and a user‑mode CSRSS flaw lets a low‑integrity process inject keystrokes and files into the host. Live demos include a kernel exploit that migrates to wininit and a CSRSS exploit that performs remote keystroke injection and uploads files. Chrome requires more chaining so type A sandboxes break far easier.

AI-written summary · about

  1. 0:00Introduction
  2. 1:17Agenda
  3. 1:52What is a sandbox
  4. 2:42Types of sandbox
  5. 4:26OS internals
  6. 5:39Type A Sandbox
  7. 8:08Type B Sandbox
  8. 9:13Master vs Slave
  9. 10:54Object Integrity Levels
  10. 12:50Resistance to malicious slaves
  11. 14:06Adobe Reader
  12. 15:33Chrome
  13. 16:15Chrome Browser
  14. 16:48Pinkie Pie
  15. 17:56syscall filter
  16. 20:59how it works
  17. 22:19exploit
  18. 25:26serious problem
  19. 27:00user mode exploits
  20. 28:32LPC ports
  21. 29:08Adobe Reader vs Chrome
  22. 29:44PDF brute force
  23. 30:46CS RSS vulnerability
  24. 32:07CS RSS exploit
  25. 41:08Defense indepth
  26. 52:03Conclusion
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