Kidney Exchange: Algorithms and Incentives

on YouTube ↗59m

" summary

Fifteen years of kidney exchange evolution: algorithmic models move from two-way matchings to non-simultaneous chains because logistics and high-sensitization make short cycles insufficient; computational work uses integer programming and faces CPLEX memory problems for intersecting chains; operations fixes include centralized blood testing, threshold acceptances and publishing multiple optimal offers, raising offer-to-transplant yield from ~15% to about 50% offer acceptance; chains reach extreme cases (a 60-person chain filmed), and exchanges now supply roughly 10% of US living-donor transplants.

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" chapters (35)

1. 0:00Introduction
2. 2:37Journals
3. 3:32Shapley Scarf
4. 4:23Top Trading Cycles
5. 7:05Preferences
6. 8:59Housing
7. 9:50Transplants
8. 10:14Waiting list
9. 11:47Trading cycles
10. 13:25Living vs deceased donors
11. 13:56Logistical problems
12. 16:29Twoway exchanges
13. 17:05Greedy algorithms
14. 17:59Results of blood tests
15. 20:44Compatibility
16. 25:48Chains
17. 26:38Nondirected donors
18. 26:57Chain of transplants
19. 28:06After a maximal exchange
20. 29:04The game has changed
21. 29:46Directors of transplant centers
22. 29:57Logistical reasons
23. 31:06Patient sensitivity
24. 31:45Compatibility graph
25. 33:27Cycle size
26. 34:12Non simultaneous chains
27. 35:56Computational notes
28. 36:57Column generating methods
29. 37:23Operational changes
30. 40:03Medical rejections
31. 42:55Optimal solutions
32. 44:04Long chains
33. 47:07Methodist Hospital
34. 49:52Random Graphs
35. 53:58Gary Hill

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