Fragile Nonce Selection and ZKPs as a Solution
summary
Shows that deterministic nonce generation (RFC6979/Merlin) fixes single signatures but fails for multi‑party Schnorr/ECDSA because differing challenges leak keys, and proposes embedding a PRF/VRF‑like primitive inside a ZKP so nonces are deterministically proven rather than trusted. Reports an optimized construction for arithmetic circuits under DDH that fits under 2048 multiplication gates (work in progress). ZKPs make transcripts unique and cut replay attacks, but threshold signatures need a broadcast channel — ZKPs don’t remove the requirement when parties can disappear.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Fragile nonce selection
- 2:34Risks of biased nonces
- 5:43Hardware wallet security
- 9:57Multi-signature nonce challenges
- 13:51ZKPs for deterministic nonces
- 17:04Threshold signatures and broadcast
- 22:38Can ZKPs replace broadcast?
- 25:05Conclusion
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