Shuchi Chawla
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| title | conference | date |
|---|---|---|
| Competitive Analysis Meets Stochastic Input: Secretary Problems And Prophet Inequalities | Data-Driven Decision Processes Boot Camp 2022 | 2022-08-22 |
Algorithms assume a partly adversarial, partly stochastic input and give concrete, constant-factor guarantees: a single threshold yields a 2-approx for… | ||
| Individual Fairness in Advertising Auctions through Inverse Proportionality | ITCS 2022 | 2022-01-31 |
Proposes and analyzes inverse proportional allocation that enforces a multiplicative-to-additive fairness constraint called value stability while retaining… | ||
| Pandora's Box with Correlations: Learning and Approximation | Mathematics of Online Decision Making 2020 | 2020-10-23 |
Shows that with only sample access to an unknown joint distribution over costs it is possible to learn a partially adaptive probing policy that is provably… | ||
| Themis: Fair and Efficient GPU Cluster Scheduling | NSDI 2020 | 2020-02-25 |
Proposes a new finish-time fairness (Rho) metric and a two-step allocator: filter top (1−f) apps then run a partial-allocation auction that computes a… | ||
| Timing Matters: Online Dynamics in Broadcast Games | Learning, Algorithm Design and Beyond Worst-Case Analysis | 2016-11-14 |
Broadcast broadcast-game with Shapley cost sharing can hit worst-case Nash gaps of Θ(n) but best equilibria are constant-factor. This work shows arbitrary… | ||
| Simple Pricing Schemes for Consumers with Evolving Values | Optimization and Decision-Making Under Uncertainty (Simons Institute, September 2016) | 2016-09-19 |
Considers a buyer who repeatedly uses an app whose value evolves stochastically and compares a simple pricing to the omniscient benchmark that extracts the… | ||
| Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings | Complexity and Simplicity in Economics (Simons Institute workshop, 2015) | 2015-10-12 |
Shows that a simple modification—reject each bidder with constant probability (here 1/2) then run Vickrey with reserves computed from survivors’ reported… | ||
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