Jo Van Bulck
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- FOSDEM2 editions2021–2022
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| title | conference | date |
|---|---|---|
| SoK: 20 Years of Power, Privilege, and Peril in x86 System Management Mode | 20th USENIX WOOT Conference on Offensive Technologies (WOOT '26) | 2026-08-10 |
Paper systematizes two decades of SMM research into a taxonomy and timeline, consolidating 69 studies and 57 advisories into a classification tree that shows… | ||
| Confusing Value with Enumeration: Studying the Use of CVEs in Academia | USENIX Security '25 | 2025-08-13 |
Analysis of 1,803 CVEs claimed in 304 papers finds 34% unconfirmed or disputed, 274 reserved, 288 with no maintainer response, and 52 where maintainers say… | ||
| Breaking and Securing Memory Isolation in Texas Instruments Microcontrollers | RuhrSec 2025 | 2025-02-20 |
RuhrSec is the annual English speaking IT security conference with cutting-edge security talks by renowned experts. RuhrSec is organized by Hackmanit.
🔽 More… | ||
| Opening | FOSDEM 2022 | 2022-02-05 |
Welcome, overview, lineup
A brief introduction to the room and to the sessions.
This year's TEE devroom will again be a full-day virtual event with an… | ||
| Process-based abstractions for VM-based environments | FOSDEM 2022 | 2022-02-05 |
Inaugural secure enclave platforms operate at the single user process level (e.g. SGX), meaning a single address space with potentially multiple threads, with… | ||
| Opening | FOSDEM 2021 | 2021-02-06 |
Welcome, overview, lineup
A brief introduction to the room and to the sessions.
This year's TEE devroom will be a full-day virtual event with an impressive… | ||
| Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom... | USENIX Security '18 | 2018-08-15 |
The talk explains Foreshadow, a software-only microarchitectural attack that exploits a speculative execution bug in modern Intel CPUs to break Intel SGX… | ||
| Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults... | 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security '17) | 2017-08-16 |
The paper analyzes Intel SGX-style enclaves and shows that a malicious OS can infer enclave memory accesses without causing page faults. It presents two new… | ||
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