Amol Sarwate
where else to find them
what they talk about
all 5 in the filters
where they keep going back
- BSidesSF3 editions2020–2026
all 5 in the filters
on a stage with
never shared a talk
who talks about the same things
- Kasimir Schulz6 talks
- Niall Merrigan19 talks
- Pedram Hayati5 talks
- Felix Leder4 talks
- Brian Contos3 talks
- James Kettle13 talks
| title | conference | date |
|---|---|---|
| Anatomy and Defense of LOTL Fileless Intrusions | BSidesSF 2026 | 2026-03-21 |
84% of incidents in 2025 involve living-off-the-land binaries and 47% of initial access is via click‑to‑fix lures, the talk demonstrates. Asteroth uses LNK →… | ||
| Ransomware and Backups: A Multi-Layered Defense Strategy | BSidesSF 2024 | 2024-05-04 |
Ransomware targets backup stores and the presentation lays out a concrete multi-layered defense: strengthen NIST 3-2-1 with prevention, detection, analytics… | ||
| Real Time Vulnerability Alerting by Using Principles from the United States Tsunami Warning Center | OWASP Global AppSec Virtual 2020 | 2020-10-22 |
A system that collects public feeds and social posts, weights signals and emits real‑time prioritized alerts is already built and running; it uses AWS Lambda… | ||
| Real Time Vulnerability Alerting | BSidesSF 2020 | 2020-02-23 |
System ingests public feeds (NVD, Exploit-DB, vendor advisories, blogs, Twitter), stores records in RDS relational DB, and uses multiple AWS Lambda jobs plus a… | ||
| Anatomy of ... POS Malware | AppSec California 2015 | 2015-01-26 |
Demonstrates that RAM scraping malware actually elevates privileges (uses seDebugPrivilege), opens the POS process and dumps committed pages with… | ||
| Anatomy of memory scraping credit card stealing POS malware | OWASP AppSecUSA 2014 | 2014-09-16 |
Shows a Windows RAM‑scraper that gains SeDebugPrivilege, enumerates processes, opens the POS process and uses ReadProcessMemory and VirtualQueryEx to scan only… | ||
| Why is SCADA Security an Uphill Battle? | AppSecUSA 2013 | 2013-11-20 |
Explains why control networks keep failing by naming actual weak points: 66% in SCADA master (HMI/DCS/web apps), real protocol flaws in Modbus DNP3 and other… | ||
| nothing matches | ||