The DROWN Attack
summary
A cross‑protocol exploit uses an SSLv2 server as a Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle to decrypt recorded TLS 1.2 sessions using 2048‑bit RSA, implemented to recover a session in under 8 hours on Amazon EC2 for $440. Internet scans find 33% of HTTPS servers (22% with browser‑trusted certs) exposed due to key/certificate reuse. Attack needs roughly 1,000 observed TLS handshakes, ~40,000 SSLv2 handshakes and ≈2^50 brute‑force work unless GPU/FPGA/OpenSSL implementation flaws reduce it to minutes.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:45SSL v2
- 3:13SSL v2 support
- 11:41Premaster secret
- 15:22Padding Oracle
- 18:41Export ciphers
- 21:02We dont yet know
- 25:52Complexity
- 27:25Shared keys
- 34:30OpenSSL
- 37:25BruteForce
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