Auctions, privacy and a cat
summary
Argues that auction design must control information flow, not just price signals, using a cat-in-a-box metaphor: keeping bids and execution details private (for example RFQ large trades or oracle-triggered liquidations) can raise winning bids and prevent destructive front‑running. Describes concrete primitives (trusted bid‑encoding scripts, SGX enclaves, multiparty computation) and shows privacy lets designers select for desirable competition, monetize informational value, and constrain on‑chain action sequencing — a largely unexplored design space.
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:48Mechanism for distribution
- 1:38Auctions
- 3:04Taxonomy
- 4:30Argument
- 4:50Control over memory
- 5:52The cat
- 11:25Recap
- 12:13Privacy
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